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The populist radical right has been a disruptive force in Western European party systems ever 
since its inception and has continued to garner regular attention from media and political 
science alike. According to Cas Mudde (2007), the populist radical right is the fourth ‘wave’ of 
the ‘postwar far right’ in Europe, who are the modern successors to a tradition of far-right 
sentiment since the end of WWII. Their increasing success at the beginning of the 21st century 
allowed some of these to enter into governing coalitions, or in the case of the Hungarian Fidesz 
or the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS), constitute a government on their own. Despite these 
electoral successes, few populist radical right parties were able to retain their positions in 
government for more than a few consecutive years. However, some parties like the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Italian Lega (formerly Lega Nord) managed to enter into several 
governing coalitions and had a significant impact on their political systems. The research on 
populist radical right parties in government so far has understandably mostly focused on their 
two most salient issues: immigration and integration policies (Akkerman and de Lange 2012; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005, 2010; Zaslove 2004), but more recent studies have also 
considered these parties’ effects on other policy fields, including economics (Röth et al. 2018; 
Ennser-Jedenastik 2016; Afonso and Rennwald 2018; Krause and Giebler 2019; Rathgeb 
2020). While early studies categorized the economic policies pursued by populist radical right 
parties as catering towards proponents of a small-state and market liberalism such as small 
business owners and craftspeople (Kitschelt and McGann 1997), later studies have noted a shift 
within the electorate of populist right wing parties away from the ‘winners of globalization’ to 
the (perceived) losers (Harteveld 2016). The populist radical right was successful in attracting 
disgruntled working-class voters with culturally authoritarian preferences, who had ended their 
support for social-democratic parties following the welfare cuts and liberal cultural policies that 
were part of the previous ‘third way agenda’. This so called ‘proletarization’ (Arzheimer and 
Carter 2006; Arzheimer 2013; Afonso and Rennwald 2018) of the populist radical right’s 
electorate had a significant effect on their economic policy and caused a shift from more 
neoliberal policies towards ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016, 
Krause & Giebler 2019). Ennser-Jedenastik (2018: 3): defines welfare chauvinism as “[the] 
political view […] that welfare benefits should be directed primarily towards members of the 
the native in-group, as delineated by citizenship, ethnicity, race, or religion.” This development 
is especially significant since populist radical right parties have been implicated in severe cuts 
to the welfare state during their time in government, such as in Austria and Switzerland 




observation is in line with what Hendrikse (2018) calls ‘neo-illiberalism’, the idea that the 
cooperation of neoliberal elites with nativist politicians from the populist radical right led to a 
newly illiberal type of market radicalism. An idea that is further corroborated by Slobodian’s 
(2019) historical account of a political alliance between economic libertarians and the American 
alt right, which emerged after a group around Ludwig H. M. Mises forced an ideological split 
within neoliberalism over a row with Friedrich A. Hayek. By analyzing populist radical right 
parties’ economic policies in government, it will be easier to determine whether these parties 
make true on their promise to implement welfare chauvinistic policies – along the lines of the 
‘new winning formula’ (de Lange 2007) – or choose to implement neo-illiberal economic 
policies, as the ‘old’ winning formula would suggest (Kitschelt and McGann 1997).  
 
This bachelor thesis begins with a detailed literature review, followed by a presentation of the 
research design in the form of a Most-Comparable-Systems-Design – an adapted type of Most-
Similar-Systems-Design (MSSD) outlined in the ‘Research Design & Methodology’ section – 
used to compare the economic policies of the Austrian FPÖ and the Italian Lega, in order to 
learn more about the policies implemented by populist radical right parties in Western European 
governments. The following analysis is conducted using a set of mixed methods encompassing 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project’s (CMP) database of over 1000 parties’ 
manifestos, the most recent data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), data from the 
European Social Survey (EES) and a quantitative and qualitative media analysis of Austrian, 
Italian and international media, as well as a systematic analysis of the parties manifestos in 
order to determine the type of economic policies enacted by populist radical right parties in 
government. The results of my bachelor thesis show that populist radical right parties in 
government reliably choose to implement neoliberal policies over welfare chauvinistic ones, 
even if they are detrimental to their voters. Only by exhibiting strong pressure on the party 
elites, the populist radical right electorate is able to steer their party in a more welfare 
chauvinistic direction. The fundamental disagreement within populist radical right parties 
between the party elites and the voting base leads to instability and may lead to a split within 
populist radical right parties, akin to the former FPÖ’s party elite’s decision to form the BZÖ 
after receiving strong backlash from their voter base.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 





Neoliberalism and right-wing populism were often regarded as opposites, since it was believed 
populists were protesting against a neoliberal world order. While both strands emerged from 
different ideological origins, there is evidence that highlights their various similarities. The 
silent revolution first described by Roland Inglehart (1977) served as a constitutive counterpoint 
for the populist radical right. The spread of ideas such as feminism, self-expression, 
multiculturalism, and egalitarianism were seen by some as ideologies threatening the fabric of 
society (Slobodian 2019). Traditionalists and nationalists were surprised by the success of the 
new left and sought to counter what they thought was an attack on their values. Liberalism at 
the time was torn about the issue, while some believed in the ‘cultural turn’ proposed by 
Friedrich A. Hayek, who believed that human nature was rooted primarily in culture, while a 
group of other Austrian economists around Murray Rothbard believed that differences are 
primarily rooted in biology and race. (Slobodian 2019: 3-4). This led to an ideological schism 
within neoliberalism, which was followed by an unlikely alliance between the rogue neoliberals 
gathered around Rothbard and the far right, held together by a strong belief in race and biology 
and a common opposition to the values of the silent revolution. Slobodian (2019: 4) provides 
evidence challenging the notion that right-wing populism is a backlash against the excesses of 
neoliberalism, by arguing that neoliberalism is very much compatible with illiberal, populist 
and nativist values and that the silent revolution provided the common enemy to enable this 
alliance.  
 
Hendrikse (2018) argues similarly, by addressing what he calls ‘neo-illiberalism’, the “illiberal 
mutation and restoration of transatlantic neoliberalism”. The term was originally coined by the 
Indian economist Aiyar (2016) in order to describe the state of the Indian economy during the 
term of Narenda Modi. Despite several discussions of a post-neoliberal future, we have come 
to see a fusion of the radical populist right and neoliberalism in Europe, Brazil and the United 
States (Hendrikse 2018: 169). Instead of seeing an undoing of neoliberal globalization, the 
populist radical right serves as a protective shield to the benefit of the economic core of 
neoliberalism, while simultaneously attacking checks and balances, the media as well as civil, 
human and minority rights. Neoliberal core ideas have historically been absorbed by competing 
worldviews and have consistently shown great elasticity with principles like competition, 
private property and consumer sovereignty being easily tied to either multicultural tolerance or 
to exclusion based on culture or race (Mirowski et al. 2020: 10-11). Populist radical right 
rhetoric has consistently overshadowed the ongoing deregulation, tax cuts and corporate 




(Hendrikse 2018: 170). Italy has seen right-wing populists adopting neoliberalism since the 
1990s, who imploded in government only for new populists to rise into positions of power 
(Verbeek and Zaslove: 2016). The mix of neoliberal economics and illiberal narratives may 
explain populist radical right elites’ affinity towards Friedrich Hayek. Both the FPÖ and the 
AfD have “emerged within neoliberalism, not in opposition to it” (Slobodian: 2018). Despite 
these new challengers’ lust for power, populists have bowed down to financial markets after 
being pressured by central banks like the populist government of Italy, which has promised to 
stay in the Eurozone to ensure financial stability and focused on immigrants instead. 
Neoliberalism and right-wing populism should therefore not be seen as opposites, but as closely 
bound together and be analyzed and identified as such (Hendrikse 2018: 171). 
 
II.II. Party Strategy and the New Winning Formula 
 
In their book The Radical Right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis (1995) Herbert 
Kitschelt and Anthony J. McGann argued that the success of the extreme right is contingent on 
the strategic choices of moderate conservative parties. By appealing to free market proponents 
and ethnocentric nativist voters, these parties are able to attract small independent 
businesspeople, such as shopkeepers, family farmers, and craftspeople and blue-collar workers. 
They called this strategy the ‘winning formula’ and highlighted its potential to target ‘working-
class authoritarians’ by providing them with the themes of authority, nation and race, while 
simultaneously providing their petite bourgeois base with an extreme anti-statist, pro-business 
message against the ‘bureaucratic Moloch’ of the advanced welfare state (Kitschelt and 
McGann 1997: 275). In this sense, a significant portion of the electorate of the populist radical 
right has sympathies for neoliberal economic policies, while favoring nativist illiberal cultural 
policies. Both Lega and the FPÖ were founded upon this clientele and were able to mobilize 
broad-based resentments against the “hydra” of an overextended party state (Kitschelt and 
McGann 1997: 276).  
 
The idea that the populist radical right was composed of authoritarians with anti-statist, pro-
free market policy preferences was questioned by Sarah L. de Lange (2007), who argued that 
there has been a shift since the 1990s towards a new winning formula. According to de Lange, 
populist radical right parties modified their ideological appeal to move to a more centrist 
economic position. This shift was caused by a significant increase of disgruntled former social-
democratic working-class voters with socialist-authoritarian attitudes as opposed to capitalist-




remained strongly authoritarian. This has a significant effect on West European party systems, 
especially since the populist radical right has entered several governments and has become part 
of the Austrian and Italian establishment (de Lange 2007: 429). Using case studies from France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands such as the Front National, Vlaams Block and Liste Pim Fortuyn, 
de Lange argued that while these parties remained authoritarian, their economic stances 
changed with their electorate. This observation was also acknowledged and supported by 
Kitschelt (2007: 1181-1182; 2001) himself, who wrote that as “the radical right’s center of 
gravity moves to low-income, low skill wage earners entirely, they may then tone down their 
market liberalism”.  
 
Jan Rovny (2014: 3-6) disagreed with the premise that it is useful to place populist radical right 
parties’ economic positions on a spectrum, due to their strategy of position blurring. He bases 
this argument on a dimensional approach to political competition made up of issue positioning, 
issue salience, and strategic positional avoidance. According to this approach populist radical 
right parties may want to avoid taking clear stances on political issues they are not invested in, 
in order to attract the greatest number of potential voters. This deliberate position blurring can 
take on many forms, presenting vague or contradictory positions on a given issue or avoiding 
presenting a stance all together. This type of strategy is particularly attractive to younger parties, 
who have yet to form a core membership amongst their supporters. As Rovny (2014: 17) argues 
this strategy is very effective for populist radical right parties in the opposition but generally 
breaks down in government. By drawing on data from the CHES, he finds that populist radical 
right parties do exhibit more position blurring while in opposition, as opposed to being in 
government. Rovny (2014: 18) supports this by highlighting how populist radical right voters 
do not tend to place as much emphasis on economic issues, but overwhelmingly vote based on 
cultural issues instead. Enggist and Pinggera (2020) found that while populist radical right 
parties make use of blurring when it comes to increasing or shrinking the size of the welfare 
state, they openly prioritize pensions, unemployment benefits and healthcare over social 
investment. A recent follow up-study by Jan Rovny and Jonathan Polk (2020) also showed that 
while the populist radical right seems to be centrist on the question of redistribution, other 
economic issues tend to remain blurry. 
 
II.III. The Populist Radical Right in Government 
 
The scientific literature on the government participation of the populist radical right routinely 




Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010; de Lange 2007), large-N 
analyses looking at the effect of government participation on party success (Bolleyer et al. 
2012) and studies measuring the impact of these parties government participation on specific 
policy fields (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). As de Lange (2007: 
22-32) argued many populist radical right parties including the FPÖ and Lega were ostracized 
up until their first chance to enter government. Despite predictions that populist radical right 
parties would crumble in government (Heinisch 2003; Mudde 2007), they overwhelmingly 
succeeded in expanding their voter base by winning issue ownership over core issues such as 
‘immigration’ and ‘security’ (Albertazzi 2010: 1319). Nicole Bolleyer, Joost van Spanje and 
Alex Wilson (2012) argued that despite FPÖ and Lega failing to achieve notable immigration 
policy changes during the Schüssel I (2003-2004) and Berlusconi II and III cabinets (2001-
2006), the FPÖ have succeeded in delivering on their promises during the Schüssel II cabinet 
(2003-2006) by significantly restricting Austrian immigration policy. However, they highlight 
the ÖVP’s role as the leading force behind the policy change and discard the idea that populist 
radical right parties had a significant direct impact on immigration policy (Bolleyer et al. 2012: 
522-523). When it comes to long term electoral success, Lega managed to outperform the FPÖ 
by maintaining an oppositional image during their time in government, thereby drastically 
improving in the polls following the Berlusconi III (2005-2006) cabinet, while the FPÖ saw 
electoral decline (Zaslove 2012: 442).  
 
Within government both the FPÖ and Lega have been forced to enter coalitions as junior 
partners and have therefore either been hindered – and sometimes even supported – in the 
implementation of their preferred policies. Being on the far-right end of the political spectrum 
they have little alternative options to Christian democratic, conservative or liberal parties, 
giving them a relatively weak bargaining position. This still leaves populist radical right parties 
with the option of walking away or logrolling – quid pro quo negotiations – their coalition 
partner in order to get concessions from them (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 579-580). As 
Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg (2014) have shown, coalition policies rarely reflect the 
preferences of the ministers who propose them, but instead are based on a compromise between 
government parties. As such individual ministers attempting to dictate specific policy changes 
are severely hampered when faced with disagreement from their coalition partners. What 
follows from this observation is that coalition bargaining is critical to successful policy 
implementation, since the compromise determines which policies are in fact enacted (Martin 




the FPÖ, as there was resounding agreement in many policy areas such as immigration and 
asylum, even though both parties’ stances on economic issues initially differed. This provided 
for easy coalition negotiations, which were prepared in advance by chancellor Kurz, who 
normalized the FPÖ’s restrictive immigration policies by taking up similar policy proposals 
and deliberately downplaying their more xenophobic remarks (Eberl et al. 2020: 2). The M5S-
Lega coalition on the other hand was formed based on the necessity for both parties to cooperate 
in order to prevent re-elections which would have potentially cost them a considerable number 
of votes. Both parties’ ideological distance from one another and their disagreement over who 
their main enemy is – the ‘outsider’ for the FPÖ and the ‘elites’ for M5S – presented both 
parties with difficult coalition talks (Newell 2019: 1). Due to Movimento Cinque Stelle’s 
inexperience compared to Lega and both parties’ reliance on one another, Lega was able to 
receive more concessions from M5S than their election results would have warranted. 
 
II.IV. Economic Policy and Welfare Chauvinism 
 
In the past economic policy only played a minor role for populist radical right parties, but ever 
since the Eurocrisis and especially after the European refugee crisis there have been more and 
more advocates among the far right supporting the idea of ‘welfare chauvinism’. Welfare 
chauvinism is a nativist policy guided by the belief that welfare benefits should be directed 
primarily towards members of native in-group based on citizenship, ethnicity, race or religion 
(Ennser-Jedenastik 2018: 3). In a foundational work, Oesch (2008) identified the welfare 
chauvinist electorate of the populist radical right as consisting of two core groups the petite 
bourgeoisie and the working class, two groups that are typically reliant on social insurance and 
the generous welfare systems of Western European countries. Out of fear of an extension of 
these social programs to perceived ‘outsiders’, populist radical right voters turn towards welfare 
chauvinism in order to exclude them from these services. Especially the populist radical right 
has been successful in mobilizing this group by appealing to working-class voters – who 
traditionally hold more positive views on welfare – by presenting immigrants and refugees as 
potential drags on the welfare system. This issue linkage between immigration and welfare was 
successful in attracting more voters to the populist radical right, but at the same time forced 
these parties to reconsider their stances on welfare state reduction and redistribution (Afonso 
and Rennwald 2018: 7). This so called ‘proletarization’ – first noted by Hans-Georg Betz in 
1994 – was possible due to the significant potential of working-class authoritarians among the 
electorates of left-wing parties, which could be tapped into by moving to the economic left 





To understand how welfare chauvinism is implemented, Leonce Röth, Alexandre Afonso and 
Dennis C. Spies (2019) analyzed how populist radical right parties shaped socio-economic 
policies in Western Europe by comparing their impact on redistributive and regulative 
economic policies using quantitative and qualitative methods. They support the idea that the 
populist radical right mobilizes the majority of their voters primarily on the value/identity 
dimension as opposed to the socio-economic dimension and make use of a blurring strategy as 
long as they are in opposition. When entering into a government coalition these parties should 
either implement more centrist policies as the new winning formula would suggest, or advocate 
for tax cuts and financial deregulation according to the winning formula. According to Röth et 
al. (2018: 328) any reduction in social spending in the form of welfare cuts could be dangerous 
for the populist radical right, since their voter base overwhelmingly depends on social insurance 
programs like pensions (Häusermann et al. 2013, Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015). On the other 
hand, financial deregulation and privatization are far less problematic in terms of bargaining 
and effects on their voter base, since their effects will be felt by low income voters only in the 
long term. Based on this, one should expect the populist radical right to demand tougher 
immigration legislation and offer up deregulation as a concession, while blocking welfare 
entrenchment (Röth et al. 2018: 329). Additionally, financial deregulation can weaken neo-
corporatism and thereby hurt state-market institutions and trade unions whose power populist 
radical right parties’ want to break (Rathgeb 2020: 5-6). As both Lega and FPÖ can arguably 
be determined to stem from an anti-tax, anti-state background, it is not surprising that they are 
able to mobilize voters without moving to the economic center, but may choose to promote 
welfare chauvinistic policies in the hope of increasing their electoral gains. As Harteveld (2016: 
232) points out, this could backfire, however, since the parties might lose more educated voters 
who tend to show up more reliably at the polling stations. The work of Afonso and 
Papadopoulos (2015) showed how the populist radical right Swiss SVP (Swiss People’s Party, 
Schweizer Volkspartei) was unable to pass market liberal pension reforms out of fear of a 
backlash from their voters, except for bills that could successfully be framed as targeting 
‘undeserving’ recipients of social benefits (Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015: 630). Similarly, 
Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) noted how the FPÖ’s decision to back pension reforms led to a 
conflict between the government, the opposition and even within the FPÖ. This conflict 
eventually caused a split of the FPÖ in 2005, resulting in a loss of all government positions and 
the majority of seats in the lower chamber of parliament. Only when the FPÖ decided to re-




again, and soon managed to leave both the SPÖ and the ÖVP behind in the polls (Ennser-
Jedenastik 2016: 415-416). This abandonment of neoliberal economic positions in favor of a 
centrist agenda in order to please their working-class voters has been noted repeatedly within 
the literature (Kitschelt and McGann 2005; de Lange 2007; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 
2016), with some acknowledging that populist radical right parties continue to blurr their 
economic positions despite of this (Röth et al. 2018: 328; Rovny and Polk 2020). 
 
II.V. Coalition Theory and Portfolio Allocation 
 
For an analysis measuring the influence of a particular party on socio-economic policy in a 
given coalition government, it is important to determine the power relations and the ability of 
each party to control ministerial portfolios. For this purpose, new perspectives and tools have 
been developed for measuring and understanding the power relations within coalitions. Many 
game theoretic models of non-cooperative games, for example, are based on the perspective of 
individual participants who are concerned about doing as well for themselves as possible. 
Cooperation under this assumption is only possible because it is in the best interest of each 
individual, since each fears retaliation from the others if cooperation were to break down (Laver 
1998). Another important question when it comes to coalition building is, which underlying 
assumptions the analytical model is based on. For example, office-seeking – the assumption 
that politicians are motivated above all else to get into office – can be one way of explaining a 
party’s decision to abandon a specific policy or some specific interests of their voters, as 
opposed to policy-seeking – the assumption that the politicians are interested in office primarily 
in order to influence policy. There is also a substantial evidence of a strong correlation between 
the allocation of portfolios and the policy package that coalition parties agree upon. Policies 
are also more often adopted fully when the respective parties are located closer to each other 
on any given policy dimension. These are additional arguments for using models that 
incorporate both office and policy payoff distribution (Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik 2012: 
798).  
 
There is further strong evidence that the allocation of ministerial portfolios is proportional to 
the seats a party gains in coalition talks (Browne and Frendreis 1980). In their analysis, the 
authors have found that parties located near the extremities of the coalition-resources variable 
have received a disproportionate share of ministries. This so-called relative weakness effect 
leads to small parties being allocated a bigger share of ministerial portfolios, while very large 




or three members were typically “overpaid”, while large parties lost substantially in these 
smaller coalitions. The rationale behind this is that small parties are overpaid because large 
parties (with a greater relative size) are in a strong position in negotiations and therefore able 
to give up ministries without surrendering the control of coalition policy making. As Eric C. 
Browne and John P. Frendreis (1980: 768) demonstrate, coalition processes are social rather 
than compulsive and reflect the fact that individual self-interest is conditional upon the ability 
of coalition partners to maintain some degree of harmony within the coalition. Within the spatial 
modelling framework, center-right and populist radical-right parties tend to share several 
similarities on a cultural level, differing most noticeably on the economic axis. This relative 
proximity to the positions of parties helps predict the higher likelihood of a coalition between 
parties such as FPÖ and ÖVP. While the coalition dynamics between two populist parties from 
opposite sides of the left-right-spectrum like M5S and Lega are much more difficult to map, 
they would generally predict a much lower likelihood for a coalition. In both cases, however, a 
minimal winning coalition was the most likely outcome considering the electoral results (Di 
Virgilio et al. 2015: 15-16).  
 




Based on the literature and the aforementioned observations, six hypotheses were formulated 
with regards to the populist radical right in general and Lega and FPÖ in particular. The first 
is: 
 
H1: Populist radical right parties will support more neoliberal socio-economic policies 
when in a coalition with center-right parties 
 
This hypothesis is based on the idea that populist radical right parties are unable to form 
coalitions with parties on the left, due to their far-right views on cultural issues and are therefore 
dependent on the willingness of conservative, Christian-democratic or liberal parties to enter a 
coalition with them. Populist radical right parties will therefore have to concede welfare state 





H2: Due to their similar positions on the left-right axis populist radical right parties will 
have an easier time agreeing on socio-economic policy with center right parties (ÖVP 
and FPÖ) than center left parties (Lega and M5S) 
 
Ideological congruence between the governing parties plays an important role during coalition 
talks and in government and may differ widely based on the results of the national elections. 
While FPÖ and ÖVP share a common history, promote similar policies and have governed 
together once before, one should expect them to be able to agree on a common socio-economic 
policy much more easily, than Lega and Movimento Cinque Stelle, who are on opposite sides 
of the political spectrum, have no prior history of cooperation and represent different strands of 
populism. 
 
H3: The amount and type of relevant economic government posts obtained by a party 
determine the level of influence they have on socio-economic policy 
 
Since populist radical right parties in Europe have so far only entered government as junior 
partners, their direct influence on socio-economic policies depends heavily on the resorts they 
were able to obtain during coalition talks. Based on this one should expect socio-economic 
policies to reflect the preferences of both coalition partners, while favoring the policies 
promoted by the partner with the most economic posts. 
 
H4: Populist radical right elites favor neo-liberal economic policies, while most of their 
socialist-authoritarian electorate prefer centrist economic policies 
 
Since populist radical right parties were formed by pro-business authoritarians, their elites 
overwhelmingly held market-liberal views on healthcare, government and social spending, 
reflecting the interests of their electorate of small independent businesspeople such as 
shopkeepers or family farmers. While the populist radical right has been successful in attracting 
working class voters with more socialist-authoritarian views, their party elites are made up of 
capitalist-authoritarians. This provides the party elites with further incentives to cooperate with 
liberal and conservative parties, who propose similar policies.  
 
H5: Populist radical right parties make use of welfare chauvinistic policy proposals in 





Following the observation that populist radical right elites are significantly more economically 
liberal than their voters, it is logical to assume that they will attempt to attract as many 
authoritarian voters from left-wing parties as possible in order to win elections. Based on this 
one would expect radical right populists to add several welfare chauvinistic appeals to socialist-
authoritarian voters to their party manifestos. 
 
H6: The socio-economic policies implemented by populist radical right parties in 
government are more neoliberal than the welfare chauvinistic policy proposals in their 
manifestos 
 
Assuming that populist radical right elites are economically liberal, one would assume that they 
will show support for deregulation and tax cuts in government, contradicting the welfare 
chauvinistic policy proposals presented in their manifestos. 
 
III.II. Research design & Methodology 
 
The analysis is conducted using a Most-Comparable-Systems-Design by comparing two 
Western European radical right-wing populist parties’ socio-economic policies in government. 
When I initially chose to conduct a Most-Similar-Systems-Design, I realized early on, that due 
to the extreme heterogeneity of populist radical right parties, conducting such a comparison 
would be difficult. Even though I acknowledge the consequences this heterogeneity has on my 
research design, I would like to strengthen the case for a comparison of the two parties that I 
chose. When accounting for the fact that many populist radical right parties that shared more 
similarities to the FPÖ, like the German AfD or the Swiss SVP, either haven’t successfully 
entered into a government coalition yet (in the case of the AfD) or entered the government like 
SVP but in a different type of party democracy altogether (Switzerland is a representative 
democracy with direct democratic elements) Lega and the FPÖ are left as the most comparable 
populist radical right parties who entered government in Western Europe. This design was 
particularly interesting not only because they both entered government as junior partners, but 
because they entered government as junior partners to a center-right party in the case of the 
FPÖ and a populist center-left party in the case of Lega. This is the reason I maintained the 
structure and method of a normal Most-Similar-Systems-Design, but decided to give it the more 





This comparison between two most-comparable populist radical right parties is conducted in 
order to qualitatively derive new insights over the economic policies enacted by them during 
their time in government. By comparing two radical right-wing populist parties’ policies it is 
possible to determine whether their economic policy is based more on radical free market ideas, 
centrism or based on welfare chauvinism and what type of economic policies these parties 
implement when in government. For this analysis the Italian Lega, formerly known as Lega 
Nord, and the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; FPÖ) were chosen, due 
to the fact that they have many characteristics in common. Starting with their populist radical 
right party affiliation, there are many similarities ranging from a similar ideology, governmental 
experience and electoral success to their ties to Russian foreign interest and their repeatedly 
early loss of governmental control. A key difference in their accession to government, however, 
is that the FPÖ entered the coalition as a junior partner to the right-wing Christian-democratic 
Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), while Lega became junior partner 
to the left-wing populist Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle; M5S). Due to their 
role as a junior partner, both parties’ ability to implement their economic policy proposals also 
depends on the amount and types of posts they hold in government.  
 
To measure the differences in these parties’ ideologies and how they relate to their coalition 
partner and to one another, the – at the time of this writing – most recent data from the 
Manifesto-Project (2019b), the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2019) and the European Social 
Survey is drawn. The goal is to show how these parties present themselves and how they are 
perceived by their electorate and their voters respectively. This is done, in order to present a 
clear picture of the parties’ socio-economic profile over time, both within their manifestos and 
according to their electoral base, so that it is possible to compare their policy proposals to the 
actual socio-economic policies these parties enact and support while being part of a government 
coalition. Following this, a qualitative and quantitative media analysis of several English, 
German and Italian newspapers is conducted in order to determine the coverage on and 
characterization of the socio-economic policies enacted by the FPÖ and Lega during their time 
in government. The newspaper articles were selected based on a systematic keyword research 
on google of the keywords: ‘FPÖ Wirtschaftspolitik’, ‘FPÖ economic policy’, ‘Lega politica 
economica’, ‘Lega economic policy’ as well as in conjunction with ‘neoliberal’/’neoliberale’ 
and ‘welfare’/’Wohlfahrt’/‘sociale’ for the selected timeframe. The main focus of this analysis 
will be the Conte I cabinet (01.06.2018 – 05.09.2019) of Italy and the Kurz I cabinet 




German and Italian media coverage, the success or failure with regard to the implementation of 
these policies will be determined. A comparison of these different sources is used to highlight 
FPÖ’s and Lega’s socio-economic policy proposals, scrutinize if and how these policies where 
enacted during their time in government and attempt to find explanations for the discrepancies. 
In the discussion, the consequences of the policies enacted by Western European populist 
radical right parties will be discussed in the context of their voter base and their current and 
future success among low-income voters.  
 
III.III. Case Selection 
 
The FPÖ was founded in 1955 as a regionalist party in Kärnten under the name of 
Freiheitspartei Kärtnens. Its first elected party representative was the former SS-Soldier Anton 
Reinthaller, who gained a simple majority in the first intra-party election after the founding of 
the party. In 1980 the economically liberal wing of the FPÖ won the upper hand and was able 
to join a coalition with the Austrian Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, 
SPÖ) under Vice-Chancellor Norbert (1983-1987). The precursor to the Lega Nord, known as 
Lega Lombarda – Alleanza per il Nord, was founded in 1987 and is unquestionably linked to 
the charismatic leadership of Umberto Bossi (Albertazzi et al. 2011: 474). After being invited 
into government for the first time by Forza Italia in 1994, the party has steadily risen in the 
polls and remained a stable segment of the right-wing bloc in Italy. What both parties have in 
common is their sudden success during the third wave of the populist radical right, allowing 
them to form the FPÖ-ÖVP (later FPÖ-ÖVP-BZÖ) coalition between 2000-2007, and the Lega 
Nord again together with Forza Italia from 2008-2011. On an international level, FPÖ and Lega 
have frequently been organized within the same party groups inside the European Parliament, 
such as Europe Freedom and Democracy (2009-2014), Europe of Nations and Freedom (2015-
2019) and until the present-day Identity and Democracy (2019-present). Another commonality 
is the fact that both the FPÖ and Lega signed cooperation treaties with the governing party in 
Russia, President Putin’s United Russia, in 2016 (FPÖ) and 2017 (Lega) respectively. Based 
on their ideological roots, the FPÖ was born out of an Austrian pan-nationalist, anti-clerical 
and economic liberal movement, while the Lega Nord used to be a regionalist party in Northern 
Italy and promoted the secession of an area, they named Pandonia. Lega and FPÖ share many 
similarities like a hierarchical centralized party structure and nativist attitudes, but are 
overwhelmingly different when it comes to their ideological roots. While the FPÖ’s foundation 
as an originally economically liberal party – which turned towards right-wing populism only in 




measures, both FPÖ and Lega shifted their positions not only on immigration, but also on socio-
economic policy and hold very similar authoritarian, nativist and populist views today (see 
Table 1). Controlling for all these variables, the analysis of both parties’ socio-economic 
policies in government should allow to make some inferences into why radical right-wing 
populist parties may support more either more economically liberal or more centrist economic 





 Table 1: Most Similar Systems Design for the FPÖ and Lega Nord1 
 
The two most recent instances of government participation are the Schüssel II cabinet (2003-
2007) and the Kurz I cabinet (2017-2019) for the FPÖ and the Berlusconi IV cabinet (2008-
2011) and the Conte I cabinet (2018) for Lega. The Schüssel II cabinet was the continuation of 
the first coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ and was notable for the implosion of the FPÖ 
within government, due to the fact that mid-government their voter base disagreed with the 
neoliberal economic reforms supported by the (former) FPÖ elites, which led to the founding 
of the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ) (Akkerman and de Lange 2012: 519; Ennser-
Jedenastik 2016: 415). Before the split into BZÖ and FPÖ, the populist radical right party was 
able to secure positions in the ministry of social security and ‘generations’, the ministry of 
justice and the ministry of transportation, allowing them to control both a key ‘Law and Order’ 
post, but also two central economic posts. However, the ÖVP was able to retain the ministries, 
finance, labor, the interior, foreign affairs, defense, education, agriculture and public service, 
drastically reducing the FPÖ/BZÖ’s ability to control economic policy. Meanwhile, Silvio 
Berlusconi’s newly formed joint list Il Popolo della Libertà (PdL), entered a coalition with the 
North-Italian Lega Nord (Lega, formerly ‘LN’) and the South-Italian Movimento per le 
 




Autonomie (MpA) and ended with Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation after numerous corruption 
scandals and the loss of his majority in parliament. While the PdL was able to hold on to the 
majority of government posts, the Lega managed to control the ministry of the interior and 
briefly the ministry of agriculture. Their relatively weak performance in the elections forced 
them to hold off on many key positions they were keen on steering. 
 
After over 7 years, these governments were followed by the Kurz I cabinet formed between the 
ÖVP and FPÖ to break the ‘gridlock’ between grand coalitions in Austria. Both parties agreed 
to implement drastic changes for the Austrian welfare state by reducing taxes and spending on 
social security, while also targeting unions and the social democratic voting base. For that 
purpose, the FPÖ gained the ministries of the interior, labor, defense, social security and 
‘generations’, transportations and public service and sports. With this significantly bigger 
portfolio thanks to significant electoral gains, the FPÖ was able to play a much more influential 
role within the new coalition government and controlled key economic and law and order 
positions, paramount to implement their preferred policies. The Conte I cabinet in Italy was the 
product of the new populist majorities that emerged during the 2018 election, leading the two 
biggest winners Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) and Lega to agree to enter into a coalition. 
Neither party had very much experience in government, but compared to Lega, M5S lacked the 
organizational structure to ensure a simple power transition. Several new posts needed to be 
filled, which is why the relatively new M5S chose to support many independent candidates for 
ministries like prime minister, foreign affairs, economics and finance and education, while 
filling the ministries of labor, defense, economic development, justice and education 
themselves. This left Lega with the ministry of the interior, the ministry of agriculture and the 
ministry of public administration, severely limiting their ability to influence labor relations and 











IV.I. Parties’ positions on deregulation and welfare 
 
In order to test my hypotheses, I chose to employ mixed methods ranging from database 
evaluations, keyword analyses and in-depth analyses of party manifestos and coalition 
agreements. Starting off by distinguishing the differences and similarities between FPÖ’s and 
Lega’s positions, I used data from the Manifesto Project relating to the parties’ positions on 
welfare, multiculturalism, immigration, regulation and market mechanisms and created a 
number of graphs. The results show significant similarities between Lega’s and FPÖ’s 
manifestos with regard to their contents and highlighted the stark difference between their 
coalition partners. In order to compare the ideological positioning of FPÖ, Lega and their 
respective coalition partners, I make use of the Manifesto Project’s rile index, which is an 
aggregation of 24 categories to a common score between the theoretical -100 (if a party only 
mentions left-wing issues in its program) and +100 (if a party promotes right-wing issues in 
their manifesto only) used to measure parties’ left-right position developed by Laver and Budge 
(1992). There are of course also issues considered to be centrist and most parties mention issues 
 




from both sides of the aisle, which is why most empirical examples can be found in close 
proximity to the middle (0). The formula is: rile = R – L , R being the sum of ‘per-variables’ 
considered to be right-wing issues and L being the sum of per-variables considered as left-wing 
issues (Manifesto-Project 2019: [https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/tutorials/main-dataset]). 
 
When it comes to analyzing both coalition partner’s ideological similarities to their radical 
right-wing populist junior partners, the ÖVP’s and FPÖ’s ideological positioning is frequently 
overlapping and seems almost identical at times, as seen in Graph 1. The ideological position 
of Lega and M5S on the left-right continuum could however not be more different, even though 
there is little to no data on the more recently founded Five Star Movement. However, both Lega 
and M5S have moved on average towards a more centrist score on each side respectively shown 
in Graph 2. Seeing that the Austrian parties have such a significant overlap on many issues, it 
is expected that the ÖVP and FPÖ government will have an easier time agreeing on a common 
course of action regarding socio-economic policy proposals, especially since they have had 
prior experience in government together.  
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Graph 2: Left-Right positioning of Lega and M5S 
 
Next followed an analysis of the share of key economic terms promoted in FPÖ’s and Lega’s 
manifestos. As shown in Graph 3, both Lega and FPÖ have to some degree promoted market 
incentives since their foundations, however, FPÖ’s mentions of creating incentives for private 
companies increase following their first government participation in 2001, hitting a spike in 
2006 and in 2013, while decreasing to the same moderate level as Lega’s in between 2017 and 
2018. This is an example for both parties support for using market incentives as opposed to 
regulation to achieve their political goals more in line with neoliberal thought. Contrary to 
classical neoliberalism is the relatively high amount of negative mentions of multiculturalism 
for the FPÖ’s manifesto, which is to be expected for populist radical right parties, even though 
Lega’s manifesto seems unexpectedly devoid of similar mentions up until 2018 (Graph 4). 
Especially interesting is the strong focus on welfare expansion of both parties, which runs 
contrary to the ideas of small government and free market capitalism. Mentions of welfare state 
expansion for FPÖ and Lega, on the other hand, almost follow an identical trajectory slowly 
treading upwards (Graph 5). While Lega’s proposals for limitations to the welfare state 
decreased drastically in 2001, mentions by FPÖ rose significantly in the time between 2008 and 
2018. Based on these basic observations the party manifestos contain a significant amount of 
national chauvinistic policy characteristics including nationalistic, authoritarian, anti-
multicultural and pro-welfare positions, while containing only comparatively few mentions of 
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of globalization’ associate free market policies with the hard-hitting neoliberal reforms imposed 
by Third Way social democrats (Harteveld 2016: 226).  
 
 






























Lega 2.159 2.159 7.063 7.246 9.64 2.917 16.19 3.511



























































Lega 1.329 1.329 0 0 1.2 0 0 2.748









































Graph 5: Mentions of Welfare State Expansion by Lega and FPÖ 
 
 



























Lega 0 0 0.929 3.221 9.64 1.25 6.667 4.809




























































Lega 4.319 4.319 3.532 0.805 0 0 0 0













































Graph 7: Mentions of the Free Market Economy by Lega and FPÖ 
 
 
Using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend file 1999-2014 and the Chapel 
Hill Expert Flash Survey 2017, the socio-economic positions of Lega and FPÖ can be further 
analyzed, by not just relying on their self-presentation in their manifestos, but also taking public 
perception into account. The data is structured on a scale from 0 to 10, with 5 representing a 
relatively neutral position on the subject. To determine FPÖ’s and Lega’s positions on the 
socio-economic axis, five categories were determined to be of particular interest: Support for 
deregulation, opposition to redistribution, preferred type of immigration policy, opposition to 
multiculturalism, and opposition to ethnic minority rights. 
 
When it comes to support for deregulation, Lega used to be more openly in favor of deregulation 
than the FPÖ, but after a small drop in 2014 their support for deregulation increased again 
(Graph 8). While FPÖ supported redistribution back in 2006, they have since significantly 
reversed their ideas on that very policy. Together with Lega who already consistently opposed 
redistribution prior to 2014, the FPÖ now also seems to lean towards opposing redistribution 
(Graph 9). On the topic of integration both parties are almost identical, promoting a clear 
assimilationist approach over a distinct policy of multiculturalism (Graph 10). Also in line with 
their populist radical right ideology is Lega’s and FPÖ’s general opposition to multiculturalism, 
which remains consistent except for a small dip in 2014 for Lega (Graph 11). Finally, both Lega 
and FPÖ seem to show strong opposition to an expansion of ethnic minority rights, even though 

























Lega 1.495 1.495 0 1.61 1.61 0 2.381 0.229











































survey data from the Chapel Hill Survey, it seems unlikely that either FPÖ or Lega were to 
implement neoliberal and market radical reforms in government up until 2014, with a 
significant reversal of this trend only setting in during 2019. This gradual change strengthens 
the case for a move away from the earlier observed economically centrist, welfare chauvinist 
policy. Despite formerly showing fewer clear signs of neoliberal policies, the balance between 
welfare chauvinism and neoliberalism has since tipped in favor of neoliberal economic policy, 





Graph 8: FPÖ’s and Lega’s support for deregulation on a scale from 0 to 10 
 
 
2006 2010 2014 2019
FPÖ 5.67 5.07 5.20 6.10

































Graph 9: FPÖ’s and Lega’s opposition to redistribution on a scale from 0 to 10 
 
 
Graph 10: FPÖ’s and Lega’s stances on assimilation vs. multiculturalism  
on a scale from 0 to 10 
 
2006 2010 2014 2019
FPÖ 2.67 4.86 4.70 5.60






























Lega-FPÖ Opposition to Redistribution
2006 2010 2014 2017 2019
FPÖ 9.83 9.50 9.89 9.80



































Graph 11: FPÖ’s and Lega’s opposition to multiculturalism on a scale of 0 to 10 
 
 
Graph 12: FPÖ’s and Lega’s opposition to ethnic minority rights on a scale from 0 to 10 
 
In order to determine the strength of welfare chauvinistic attitudes among voters of Lega and 
FPÖ, data provided by the European Social Survey from 2018 was used. A key question posed 
to populist radical right voters in the survey that can serve as an indicator for welfare 
chauvinistic attitudes was ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [Austria/Italy]'s 
2006 2010 2014 2017 2019
FPÖ 9.83 9.57 9.90 9.90































Lega-FPÖ Opposition to Multiculturalism
2006 2010 2014 2017 2019
FPÖ 9.83 8.93 8.80 9.10






































economy that people come to live here from other countries?‘. The responses show that 
overwhelmingly voters of the Italian Lega and the Austrian FPÖ share an almost identical 
distrust towards immigration and believe immigration has a negative effect on their countries’ 
economy (Graph 13 & 14). While 19 percent of voters for FPÖ and Lega each believe that 
immigration has no significant positive or negative effect on the economy, the majority believes 
the effect is bad (26 percent), very negative (21 percent), or even detrimental to the economy 
(15 percent). The linking of economic issues and the efficiency of the welfare state to 
immigration, allows populist radical right parties to attract voters, who fear competition from 
‘outsiders’ for both jobs and welfare programs. By convincing these voters that immigration 
has negative effects on the economy, Lega’s and FPÖ’s leadership are able to get them to agree 
to welfare cuts, privatization and deregulation, as long as it mostly hurts perceived ‘outsiders’ 
(Rathgeb 2020: 4-5). This corroborates the observation that while populist radical right parties 
generally attempt to defend the status quo when it comes to redistribution, they may offer up 
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Graph 14: Effect of immigration on the economy according to FPÖ voters on a scale from 0 
to 10 
 
IV.II. In-depth manifesto analysis 
 
An in-depth analysis of the parties’ manifestos used during the elections prior to their entrance 
into government produced several interesting results, which include similarities, differences 
and in some cases even counterintuitive policy proposals by FPÖ and Lega. Focusing on the 
electoral program and the socio-economic program of the FPÖ, there were demands for social 
security and welfare measures such as a raised minimum pension for retirees, making sure there 
was no raising of the pension age, the provision of health insurance for retirees, the 
implementation of a minimum wage of 1,500 € monthly without putting more pressure on 
employers, supporting unemployed Austrians with additional money for re-training, investing 
in more social housing with privileged access for Austrian citizens (tied to German language 
skills) and easing the access to home ownership. When it came to healthcare and social policy, 
the FPÖ proposed unifying all former Austrian health care providers into one health care 
provider for all Austrian citizens and one for ‘foreigners’, granting non-citizens access to social 
security only after 5 years of paying into the social security fund, improving wages in the 
medical and healthcare sectors, subsidizing regional products, providing incentives like 
taxation benefits for (Austrian) families choosing to have many children, targeted investment 
into the periphery, opposing all free trade agreements including CETA, TTIP and TiSA and 
closing a sector of the labor market for non-EU citizens. The manifesto lays out plans to further 
reduce bureaucracy and remove regulations by cutting the funding for administration, 
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administrative costs for housing, decreasing the tax burden to ´maximum 40% of income 
thereby cutting taxes by 12 billion €, simplifying the tax code by cutting ‘unnecessary taxes 
(Bagatellsteuern) and fees, decreasing employee income tax for companies and removing 
worker protections implemented under the former government. Their proposals include direct 
measures to strengthen Austrian businesses by reintroducing limits to taxed direct investment 
and decreasing taxes on profits, ending ‘cold progression’ in income taxes by automatically 
adapting tax brackets to the raise of expenditures and the development of a new business 
environment, which allows businessmen to decide freely whether to become members of the 
economic chamber or not. When taken together these policy proposals combine welfare 
chauvinistic positions, with market-friendly and neoliberal policies favoring economic growth 
and Austrian businesses (Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017; 
Freiheitliches Wirtschaftsprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017).  
 
In comparison, Lega’s manifesto for the 2018 election has a similar share of welfare 
chauvinistic policy proposals and neoliberal free-market ideas and combines both by promoting 
a vaguely market-friendly economic, but also distinctly exclusionary welfare policy. Among 
others Lega refers to pensions as ‘non-negotiable rights’ reserved for those who have spent a 
lifetime of work and demands state protection for pensions from any cuts, ensuring that 
pensions are granted only after 40 years of contribution (regardless of age) and proposing a 
system that they call ‘the opposite of the German Hartz reforms’ by paying workers more not 
less and restricting immigration. Their manifesto includes proposals to increase public 
investments in the Italian South by funding construction, investing in infrastructure and 
increasing financing for highly profitable activities like scientific research, culture, art and 
tourism. On monetary policy, the manifesto calls for a ‘recovery’ of monetary and economic 
sovereignty, by achieving exclusive competence on Italian trade policy, introducing a national 
hourly minimum wage, preserving welfare standards and encouraging secondary school and 
university education in order to provide workers with much needed skills on the labor market, 
to more effectively fight unemployment. On tax policy, Lega proposed the introduction of a 
single tax rate as tax relief for low income taxpayers, demanded a reduction in ‘paperwork’ and 
administrative hurdles for income tax declarations, introducing tax brackets that ensure 
progressive income taxation with a no tax area up to 7000 €, creating a flat tax system in order 
to ensure fiscal discipline, reversing the legal burden of proof by requiring the administration 
to prove unlawful conduct by the tax payer and abolishing tax report cards. On social security 




their former functions into the existing National Social Security Institute to save costs and 
increase efficiency, establish a general care register where all benefits provided by the central 
and local government can be tracked, incentivizing the return of companies that have moved 
their headquarters to other EU states for tax benefits by implementing the Flat tax, removing 
restrictive labor laws and costs, rationalizing and reducing bureaucratic measures needed for 
employment, increasing the competitiveness of Italian workers in order to attract foreign 
investment, providing businesses with more capital by cutting taxes, thereby creating more jobs 
and supporting small enterprises in their integration into production processes and the Italian 
industry (Programma di Goverrno 2018).  
 
When comparing the two populist radical right parties’ manifestos, it is very clear that even 
though both FPÖ and Lega explicitly focus on welfare chauvinistic programs, to the detriment 
of immigrants and refugees, the degree of neoliberal economic policy proposals between the 
parties vary. While the FPÖ proposes broad simplifications of the tax code, a reduction of 
bureaucracy, decreasing the tax burden overall, they propose many unexpectedly welfare 
friendly policies like raising minimum pensions, increased funding for employment centers, 
more unemployment aid and improving wages in the medical and healthcare sectors. Notably 
as seen in their manifesto, the FPÖ initially opposed free trade agreements despite supporting 
similar economic agreements in the past. Lega’s neoliberal economic policy proposals can 
mostly be reduced to tax cuts for the wealthy and middle-class, reducing welfare spending for 
administrative purposes, weakening labor laws and removing bureaucratic hurdles for citizens 
and companies. Lega also supports the maintenance of the current level of spending on 
pensions, increasing the wages for workers by introducing a national hourly minimum wage, 
fighting tax avoidance and investing in infrastructure and higher education. In that sense, FPÖ 
appears more open to expanding welfare state policy in their manifesto than Lega, who are very 
explicit about their aims to turn Italy into a more economically competitive state with fewer 
regulations and weaker organized labor. Especially FPÖ’s stance on free trade agreements and 
their broad support of welfare programs – as long as they benefit Austrian citizens only – is 
somewhat surprising, but can be explained when accounting for their vote-seeking strategy of 
attracting lower-income voters, who generally tend to have more favorable views towards 
redistribution. 
 





The national media coverage of the FPÖ’s and Lega’s economic policy differed widely, not 
least, because contrary to the broad Austrian coverage there was relatively little commentary of 
Lega’s socio-economic policy in Italy. This was not entirely unexpected, due to Lega’s strategy 
of position blurring (Rovny 2014), which led to wide coverage of the salient issues of 
immigration and integration, but few articles on their socio-economic policy proposals. Within 
the coverage of the FPÖ’s socio-economic policy, three main trends can be discerned, first 
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’ (ÖVP) policy change towards enacting (albeit relatively moderate) 
welfare chauvinistic socio-economic policies, drove the FPÖ leadership into focusing more on 
neoliberal economic policy proposals in order to expand their potential electorate, second the 
FPÖ made a U-turn regarding their stances on globalization and free trade agreements such as 
TTIP with the US and CETA with Canada, and third FPÖ implemented socio-economic policies 
that hurt parts of their own electorate especially hard by going against the interests of pensioners 
and low-income voters. As Die Presse wrote in 2017, the manifesto of the FPÖ was indicative 
of a nativist economic policy, free from any sorts of restrictions for national sovereignty over 
trade, while promoting lean bureaucracy and enabling redistribution from the top to the bottom. 
Nikolaus Kowall writes ‘the liberal economic and social policy [of the FPÖ] with its national-
protectionist orientation was close to a third way between social democracy and neoliberalism. 
The party failed, however, to derive from these approaches day-to-day political demands for a 
coherent and independent ideological framework’ (Die Presse 2017). The FPÖ entered the 
government caught off-guard by ÖVP’s new leader Sebastian Kurz’ strategy to link their core 
issues economic and social policy to immigration and integration. The co-optation of FPÖ’s 
welfare chauvinistic socio-economic policy proposals by the ÖVP – albeit with a more 
moderate rhetoric – forced the FPÖ to re-evaluate their socio-economic policy. Thus, by 
adopting a radical market-liberal economic program, the FPÖ sought to increase their visibility 
within the government and target well-off voters, traditionally represented by the market-liberal 
NEOS and the ÖVP (Die Presse 2017).  
 
In a similar vein, the FPÖ reversed their harsh criticism of free trade and globalization, thereby 
contradicting the claims made during the elections and within the manifesto. Instead, an FPÖ-
spokesperson stated ‘free economic policy is committed to free trade and international 
competition. It is also by no means hostile to the increasing global interdependence of the 
economy’, a direct contradiction of the nativist-protectionist policy outlined earlier (Die Presse 
2017). This drastic change of positions when it comes to socio-economic policy, reflects not 




mainly on salient issues such as immigration, while simultaneously downplaying and blurring 
their positions on controversial economic issues (Rovny 2014). This strategy allowed them to 
run a campaign based on promises to protect pensioners and low-income voters from the harsh 
realities of globalization but implement economic policy diametrically opposed to this claim 
(Die Presse 2017). This change of strategy, however, opened the FPÖ up to criticism from the 
low- and middle-income voters who voted them into office. Promising better opportunities for 
entrepreneurs, a functioning and world-class welfare state, while cutting taxes and government 
spending by over ten billion Euros, money which is needed to keep up the current strength of 
the Austrian welfare state, the FPÖ is sending mixed economic messages to their supporters 
(Der Standard 2017a). Despite praising Austria’s pension system, FPÖ politicians have 
continuously criticized state control and used language reminiscent of Friedrich A. Hayek’s 
belief, that the welfare state leads down a road to serfdom (Vice Deutschland 2017).  
 
By portraying his party as the ‘social home party’ Heinz-Christian Strache, the former party 
chairman, attempted to provide an alternative to the social democratic SPÖ which reflected the 
Austrian electorates more conservative socio-political stance on immigration and integration. 
This change was followed by a re-orientation from FPÖ’s trope of ‘social parasites’ targeted at 
the unemployed, towards an anti-immigration and especially anti-Muslim rhetoric. What 
remained the same, was the FPÖ’s agenda of protecting the wealthy and powerful over low-
income workers by opposing property taxes, defending banking secrecy and continuously 
reducing taxes, most of which benefitted wealthy Austrians. The self-proclaimed party of the 
‘little man’ moved away from their own proposals to strengthen workers’ rights and increase 
pensions. The nomination of Barbara Kolm, head of the Austrian branch of the neoliberal 
Hayek Institute, to the Court of Auditors, can be seen as a clear sign that the FPÖ abandoned 
their former ideas on social security and welfare expansion (Der Standard 2017a). As noted by 
Julian Aichholzer from the Institute of Political Science at the University of Vienna, the 
economic program of the FPÖ doesn’t benefit the majority of its voters. According to a poll 
conducted by the University of Vienna in 2017 of 4,000 respondents, the majority of Austrian 
voters positioned themselves center-right on socio-political issues like immigration and 
integration but left of center on social and economic policy (Der Standard 2017b).  
 
The socio-economic policies promoted by the FPÖ may hurt their own chances of success in 
the long run, since their electorate composed of working-class and lower-middle income voters 




this was the ‘working hours act’ passed by the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition which reportedly contained 
provisions, that allowed companies to enforce 12-hour work days on their employees – drawing 
lots of criticism from across the political spectrum – including their own voters, forcing them 
to publicly discuss re-evaluating the law (Der Standard 2018a). Another example was the 
coalition’s proposal to abolish ‘emergency aid’, unemployment aid for the long-term 
unemployed, followed by the implementation of draconian changes to regular unemployment 
aid. Despite originally taking a strong stance against this measure, the FPÖ soon agreed with 
and implemented the ÖVP’s proposal (Der Standard 2018b). Lastly, FPÖ’s secretary of finance 
Hubert Fuchs announced a radical simplification of the Austrian tax code by introducing flat 
taxes and abolishing compulsory financial contributions to the Chamber of Labor coming into 
force on January 1, 2020 and further tax cuts and the abolishment of the cold progression 
following in 2022 (Standard 2018c). The premature end of the coalition due to the Ibiza scandal 
that rocked the FPÖ’s political elite, made it impossible for the coalition partners to implement 
all of their proposed socio-economic policies.  
 
In comparison there was relatively little Italian coverage of Lega Nord’s socio-economic policy, 
owing to the fact that Matteo Salvini’s party focused on immigration and integration policy 
during most of their election campaign, as well as in government. While the FPÖ was successful 
in taking control of the finance ministry, Lega failed to obtain the same position within the 
Italian government, which fell to an independent economic expert severely reducing Lega’s 
influence on socio-economic policy. M5S on the other hand, was able to dominate the national 
economic coverage with their popular economic proposals, while Lega remained mostly silent 
on the issue during their time in government (Corriere Della Sera 2018). Only a few months 
prior to the premature end of the Conte I cabinet, Lega’s leadership became aware of their 
relative silence on economic policy, especially their proposals for the flat tax and government 
reforms, which drew criticism from their generally pro-business, anti-tax Northern constituents. 
By strategically placing emphasis on their economic policy proposals by involving renowned 
Italian economists, Lega was able to increase their performance in the polls so much that Salvini 
was tempted to end the coalition prematurely to win a majority. Despite this miscalculation, 
some newspapers like Start Magazine picked up Lega’s socio-economic proposals and 
highlighted their benefits and trade-offs, by highlighting the devastating effect of their flat tax 
for low-income families, including those with multiple sources of income, while 
simultaneously reducing taxes for the middle class on average about 45 percent for singles and 




tax cuts would also require reductions in state healthcare spending, increase interest on 
government-backed mortgages for new homeowners and eliminate a broad range of deductions 
for expenses related to disabled citizens (Start Magazine 2018).  
 
After a year in government under Guiseppe Conte, Lega’s leadership became increasingly 
aware that despite their success with salience on immigration, cultural issues itself are not 
enough to win the majority. While M5S was successful in investing in the South, introducing 
minimum wage and reforming unemployment aid, Lega’s Northern Italian voters were 
discontent with the socio-economic policy during the Conte I administration. Salvini’s 
memorable media appearances and photo ops in the Mediterranean were successful in directing 
the voters’ attention towards the Mediterranean Sea and the ongoing refugee crisis, but couldn’t 
hide M5S’s successes in implementing their ‘dignity decree’ (decreto dignità), supporting 
growth and job creation, and their citizenship income (reddito di cittadinanza), a type of 
universal basic income in order to help unemployed people find jobs (Il Giornale 2019). To 
dispel his Northern supporters’ concerns, Matteo Salvini decided to revive his flat tax policy 
already outlined in the coalition agreement in 2017. For this purpose, he relied on Armando 
Siri, his economic right-hand man and ideologist of the flat tax as well as economist Claudio 
Borghi Aquilini as an intellectual supporter of his Eurosceptic policies (Il sole 24 Ore 2018). 
Siri in particular had a lasting effect on Lega’s economic strategy, since his proposals did not 
only appeal to the Eurosceptic party leadership, but also the Northern entrepreneurs who hoped 
to grow their businesses significantly thanks to the single rate flat tax. As a former socialist, 
Siri joined the political right out of admiration for Silvio Berlusconi and was discovered by 
Salvini, who was intrigued by his ideas on taxes. Since then Lega has promoted a policy targeted 
to increase growth by cutting taxes and slashing administration costs and public spending, 
promising voters more and better jobs (La Repubblica 2019). These proposals could, however, 
not be successfully implemented due to Salvini’s error in trying to break up the coalition too 
early and thereby losing all ministry positions. 
 
IV.IV. International media analysis 
 
After evaluating the coverage of the Kurz I and the Conte I cabinet in national media, it is 
possible to determine several similarities and differences in the international reception of the 
socio-economic policy proposed by Lega and the FPÖ. For this analysis I evaluated 18 articles 
form several online newspapers and political science blogs using a set of 18 keywords to 




cuts/tax break/tax relief’, ‘flat tax’, ‘debt’, (welfare/national) ‘chauvinism’, 
‘populist/populism’, ‘free market’, ‘libertarian/economic liberal’, ‘labor/labour’, ‘austerity’, 
‘EU’, ‘deficit’, ‘elite’, ‘liberalization’, ‘privatization’, ‘universal basic income/UBI’. Among 
the keywords with the most mentions in articles about the Conte I government were ‘EU’, 
followed by ‘tax cut/tax break/tax relief’, ‘populist/populism’, ‘debt’, ‘flat tax’ and ‘austerity’. 
This indicates a strong focus within the media on the M5S-Lega government’s policies’ effect 
on the economy of the EU, which was particularly prevalent due to the government’s 
unwillingness to abide by the austerity measures proposed by the EU. Interestingly the two 
parties’ populist character was highlighted in many articles discussing their socio-economic 
policies, often associated with uncertainty and risk. The use of keywords such as debt and 
austerity are also indicative of the government’s long-drawn out conflict with the EU over 
Italy’s debt and the use of deficit spending. The most central findings, however, are related to 
Lega’s socio-economic proposals to implement wide ranging tax cuts and a 15% flat tax for 
companies, which would align closely to the neoliberal ideal of ‘small government’, but likely 
lead to a significant budget deficit thereby weakening the Italian welfare state. The 
comparatively low amount of mentions of the welfare state are unexpected, since Lega’s 
proposals would have significant effects on social welfare in Italy. Of note was also the fact 
that Movimento Cinque Stelle’s universal basic income was mentioned only half as much as 
Lega’s flat tax policy, indicating that Lega was able to gain more international attention with 
their socio-economic proposals despite having less success implementing them (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Keyword analysis of international media coverage of the M5S-Lega government3 
 
The evaluation of the international media coverage of the Kurz I cabinet has produced a similar 
result to the coverage of the Conte I cabinet but differed in a few significant ways. The 
keywords with the most prevalence in the international media coverage of the ÖVP-FPÖ 
 




coalition were ‘EU’, ‘tax cut/tax break/tax relief’, ‘welfare’, ‘populist/populism’ and 
‘liberalization’. The most salient topic in Austrian coverage of the FPÖ was the EU, caused by 
the party’s continuing criticism of the common currency – the Euro – and the EU’s economic 
policy. Apart from articles about criticism of EU policies, the coverage of the FPÖ was 
dominated by looming tax cuts, welfare state encroachment and liberalization of Austria’s neo-
corporatist structures. While populism was also mentioned relatively often, it was mostly used 
to describe the ÖVP’s accommodation strategy, since chancellor Sebastian Kurz took on more 
and more welfare chauvinistic positions in order to appeal to FPÖ voters and dominate the 
coalition. Faced with Kurz’s adoption of welfare chauvinistic policies, the FPÖ shifted their 
own stance towards a more aggressively liberal economic policy. This strategy seems to have 
been noted in international media, since tax cuts, welfare state reduction and liberalization were 









V.I. Evaluation of Hypotheses 
 
Reflecting on the results of my thesis, I will now evaluate my hypotheses. As stated in H1, the 
data showed that the FPÖ was associated with multiple neoliberal policies both in national and 
international media during their time in government, while the same cannot be said for Lega, 
who were mostly associated with a single policy, the flat tax. This is corroborated and adds to 
the prior studies which have found a similar connection between populist radical right parties 
in government and market-liberal economic policies (Akkerman de Lange 2012: 511-512). The 
 




second hypothesis expected that populist radical right parties would have an easier time 
agreeing on a common socio-economic policy with center right parties than with center left 
parties. This hypothesis also seems highly plausible, since ÖVP and FPÖ agreed on socio-
economic policies that would mostly exclude ‘outsiders’ from social services and those that 
would hurt the neo-corporatist element of the Austrian economy by advancing several reforms 
and liberalizations when in government. On the other hand, Lega and M5S were unable to agree 
on a common socio-economic policy and decided to appoint an independent Finance minister, 
who was neither very supportive of Lega’s flat tax, nor a proponent of M5S’s citizens’ income. 
This indecisiveness and inability to find common ground on socio-economic policy, severely 
hampered both parties’ ability to implement economic reforms of any kind.  
 
The third hypothesis stated that the amount and type of relevant economic government posts 
obtained by a party determine the level of influence they have on socio-economic policy. 
Looking at the Schüssel II and Kurz I cabinets, it is possible to see that the FPÖ managed to 
increase their portfolio of economic resorts from one, the ministry of social security and 
generations, to three, the ministries of labor, social security and generations and public service 
and sports. With this increase in relevant cabinet positions, the FPÖ’s influence on the 
economic agenda rose and enabled them to put their own handwriting on socio-economic 
policies. In the Berlusconi IV. cabinet Lega got zero economic ministry position and in the 
Conte I government, only one economic post, the ministry of public administration. 
Additionally, in the Conte I government the finance minister was independent, meaning that 
neither M5S nor Lega were fully in control of this important economic position. All these 
details support the hypotheses’ validity. The fourth hypothesis focuses on the preferences of 
populist radical right elites for neoliberal economic policies, as opposed to most of their voters’ 
support for centrist economic policies. In two governments in which the FPÖ participated they 
were involved in several internal discussions over the neoliberal economic policies proposed 
and enabled by their party executives. In 2005 this led to a split between the party elite and the 
party base resulting in the formation of the BZÖ. In the case of Lega, they willingly participated 
In Forza Italia / Il Popolo della Libertà’s policy proposals to cut social spending and reduce 
welfare programs, even if they regularly criticized the measures they were co-signing on in the 
public, as a type of ‘internal opposition’.  
 
Hypothesis five was based on the idea that radical right populist parties make use of welfare 




the results of both the data from the Manifesto-Analysis and the separate in-depth analysis 
conducted. By proposing welfare state expansion for programs that benefit pensioners and 
workers who have a steady and continuous income and families with more than one child, while 
simultaneously denying asylum seekers and immigrants many of these privileges, the populist 
radical right is able to appeal to working class voters who depend on the welfare state. In cases 
where populist radical right parties strayed too far away from their welfare chauvinist socio-
economic promises, they faced harsh criticism from their working-class constituents. While 
FPÖ faced a backlash when trying to expand the working day to 12 hours, Lega was spared 
from a similar experience, because they had little influence on socio-economic policy despite 
proposing a flat tax that would hurt the welfare state in the long run. The sixth and final 
hypothesis states that the socio-economic policies enacted by populist radical right parties are 
more neoliberal than the proposals they present in their manifestos. Both the national and the 
international media coverage of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition supports this argument, since there 
were far fewer mentions of welfare chauvinistic policy proposals than in the party’s manifesto. 
In the case of Lega hypothesis six does not fully apply, since they already proposed a fairly 
neoliberal flat tax policy in their manifesto but were unable to actually pass it in government. 
As such Lega was unable to hold on to power long enough to significantly influence socio-
economic policy enough to determine if they would have implemented the flat tax together with 
other non-mentioned neoliberal policies. 
 
V.II. Criticism, Future research topics and Outlook 
 
After concluding the analysis and discussing all hypotheses, what is left is to determine the 
main points of criticism and an outlook on future studies and areas of interest that can be 
researched based on these observations. A valid criticism of my bachelor thesis’ research design 
is the fact that despite sharing several characteristic similarities, the FPÖ and Lega are very 
different parties with varying levels of experience and electoral success. This is why I opted for 
a Most-Comparative-Systems Design. Reflecting on possible ideas for further research I have 
compiled some ideas, which would be interesting to learn more about, in order to advance the 
study of the populist radical right. On possible future research topics, I believe it would be 
interesting to analyze the structure, connections and personal policy preferences of populist 
radical right elites. By determining these factors, it would be easier to corroborate the 
observation that many populist radical right elites share neoliberal economic views, e.g. several 
leading members of the FPÖ and German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are members of 




case there were no coherent economic ideologies at play, which led to a singular focus on 
pension reform and the implementation of a flat tax at the single rate of 15 percent. Another 
interesting area of research is the long-term effect that the policies enacted by populist radical 
right parties have on their electorate, ranging from deregulation to pension reforms and cuts to 
social programs. In light of the – at the time of this writing ongoing – COVID-19-pandemic, it 
will be interesting to see how populist radical right parties will emerge from this global crisis, 




The analysis of the economic policies of populist radical right parties in government has 
generated several notable results, as expected FPÖ’s socio-economic policy in government was 
mostly economically liberal and culturally illiberal, while Lega’s economic policy proposals 
were much more mixed and contained more welfare chauvinist elements, but also the neoliberal 
flat tax. On cooperation between the governing parties, it proved much easier for the right-wing 
coalition between FPÖ and ÖVP to agree to a common economic policy than for the populist 
radical right Lega and the center-left populist Movimento Cinque Stelle. Both populist radical 
right parties were junior partners in government and the amount of relevant economic ministries 
their senior coalition partners gained vis-à-vis them, proved to be a good indicator of who could 
exhibit more control on the common economic policy. This became especially problematic for 
Lega, since they failed to pass any economic programs they proposed in their manifesto. An 
important explanatory factor for FPÖ’s extreme shift towards neoliberal policy in government 
may have been the decision of chancellor Sebastian Kurz to adopt many key welfare chauvinist 
policy proposals usually championed by the FPÖ, forcing them to re-adjust their own positions. 
While Lega remained true to their economic proposal to implement the flat tax, they failed to 
get any significant progress on the way to implement it, possibly due to a lack of economic 
ministry positions. Without more direct influence on their country’s economic policies, Lega 
were unable to make true on their promises to implement wide ranging tax cuts and introducing 
the flat tax along with entrepreneurial support, to satisfy their Northern electorate. Despite both 
parties’ government participation during the ‘fourth wave’ of radical right populism, they barely 
ruled for more than a year and ended up with very different outcomes. While the FPÖ managed 
to maintain a visible profile in government by shifting their economic policy, not without 
alienating many of their supporters – Lega was unable to gain traction for their economic policy 




rise in the polls due to Matteo Salvini’s strategic emphasis on their most salient socio-political 
issue: immigration.  
 
The observed discrepancies between the two Western European populist radical right parties 
on economic policy can be divided into three different arguments. First, FPÖ was a junior 
partner to a traditional center-right party in Austria and was therefore forced to cooperate with 
them on political issues where they had common ground – especially socio-political and cultural 
issues – but also in the economic area. Lega on the other hand, was the junior partner of a 
center-left populist party, which forced them to engage with a party with radically different 
socio-political, cultural and economic ideas from their own. However, this also allowed Lega 
to remain mostly vague on the economic front, while focusing on spreading their cultural 
messages without fearing any significant competition for their voters from within the coalition. 
Second, FPÖ decided to change their economic policy after being challenged by ÖVP, while 
Lega was able to remain committed to the flat tax because their lack of relevant ministerial 
positions allowed them to believably claim to be unable to shape economic policy in this 
government. Thirdly, while Lega focused on the salient issue of immigration and were 
successful at blaming ‘the establishment’, M5S and immigrants for Italy’s economic problems, 
FPÖ mostly blamed immigrants and the opposition but refrained from criticizing the ÖVP, 
since their coalition partner implemented many of their original policy proposals.  
 
Reflecting on my research design, there are two main points of contention with my approach to 
the research question. First, that it is hard to call Lega and FPÖ similar, despite the fact that 
they do share several characteristics and therefore it is difficult to call my research design a 
most similar systems design. As I concluded in my previous reflections, I would propose 
making use of a most comparable systems design for research questions where the population 
is so heterogenous that it is difficult to call them similar. Their commonalities and relative 
similarities are productive areas of research whether they are close to identical, or more diverse. 
Second, during the working progress it became apparent that there was a much broader set of 
data on the economic policies of the FPÖ, then for Lega’s economic policy, since the former 
regularly put much more emphasis on the issue than the latter. This made it much harder to 
compare how each party implemented their manifestos in practice, which seems especially 
relevant since both coalitions ended prematurely. Reflecting on possible trajectories to further 
the research discussed in this bachelor thesis it would be of interest to focus more specifically 




analyze the different factions (neoliberal, nativist and economic leftist) within the 
heterogeneous right wing populist party family. However, as demonstrated earlier the research 
design has highlighted some interesting traits of radical right-wing populist parties entering 
governments as junior partners and how they were and can be outmaneuvered (as seen in the 
case of the ÖVP), or continue to grow by relying on position blurring (in the case of Lega). To 
connect these results to the theories laid out at the beginning, the ‘new winning formula’ 
continued to apply for Lega, while the FPÖ reversed to a ‘winning formula’ strategy in order 
to stay in power. In the end both parties were unable to keep their hold on power, but 
nonetheless they demonstrated how flexible radical right-wing populist parties are when it 
comes to supporting or condemning market mechanisms and neoliberal economic policy. 
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